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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
No. 920069
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS1 ASSOCIATION,
a Utah corporation; and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellants,
v.
ROBERT L. MORGAN, State Engineer of the State of Utah;
and KAMAS HILLS LTD., a Utah limited partnership,
Appellees.
BRIEF OP APPELLEE UTAH STATE ENGINEER
JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(f).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Given Utah law as it existed in 1935 (both statutory and

caselaw), did the general water adjudication on the Weber R i v e r —
which culminated in the 1937 "Weber River Decree"—adjudicate or
bar

subsequent

claims

to

the

use

of

isolated

springs

and/or

percolating groundwater?
Standard of Review.

This is an issue of law to be reviewed

for correctness (Blake v. Hansen, 782 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1989)).
B.

Whether the trial court's

finding that the

isolated

unnamed springs percolating on Appellee Kamas Hills Ltd.' s property
are not and have not been "directly tributary to the Weber River
1

System" as defined in the Weber River Decree is clearly erroneous.
Standard of Review,

The trial court's factual findings are

reviewed by this Court under the "clearly erroneous standard" of
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 111
(Utah 1991)).

The evidence is surveyed in the light most favorable

to the findings (College Irr. Co. v. Logan River and Blacksmith
Fork Irr. Co.. 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1989)).
C.
evidence

Whether
did

not

the

trial

establish

court's
that

the

finding

that

percolating

Appellants'
waters

from

isolated springs on Kamas Hills Ltd.'s property "definitely make
their way into the Weber River" is clearly erroneous.
Standard of Review.

The trial court's factual findings are

reviewed by this Court under the "clearly erroneous standard" of
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, supra at 771)).
The evidence

is surveyed

in the

light most

favorable

to

the

findings (College Irr. Co. v. Logan River and Blacksmith Fork Irr.
Co., supra at 1244 (Utah 1989)).
REFERENCES TO THE RECORD ON APPEAL
References herein to the record on appeal are as follows:
"R.

" —

trial court's file, including all pleadings and

documents filed with the court.
"Tr. Vol.

, p.

" —

trial transcript.

Volume 1 is

testimony taken on September 26, 1991; Volume 2 is testimony taken
on September 27, 1991; and Volume 3 is the trial court's oral
findings of September 27, 1991.
"Exh.

" —

trial exhibit.
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STATEMENTS OF CASE AND FACTS
Appellee Utah State Engineer hereby adopts and incorporates
the Statement of Case and the Statement of Facts set forth in the
brief of Appellee Kamas Hills Ltd.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While this action arose out of an appeal of the State
Engineer's approval of a change application filed by Appellee Kamas
Hills Ltd., the "guts" of this case involve the validity of
diligence claims to certain isolated springs on which the change
application was based.
Appellants take the position that since the specific rights
set forth in Kamas Hills Ltd.'s diligence claims were not specifically mentioned or addressed in the "Weber River Decree" (the 1937
Decree in the general adjudication action on the Weber River), such
rights are cut off and barred by that Decree.

We disagree.

While it is generally true that a general adjudication action
will bar claims to water not asserted in such an adjudication, that
is not true in all cases—especially where a general adjudication
action did not or could not purport to adjudicate a particular
class of water rights.
Appellants seek to superimpose the present state of water law
on the 1921 general adjudication action regarding the Weber River,
and the shoe simply does not fit.

Our position is that under the

statutes and caselaw governing water rights prior to 1935, isolated
springs and/or percolating groundwater were not treated as public
3

water subject to the appropriation process.

Such water sources

were considered to be owned as a part of the land. Prior to 1935,
only surface waters or waters in defined channels were considered
as "public" and subject to the prior appropriation doctrine.
Under the statutes governing general water adjudications in
effect when the Weber River Adjudication was being litigated, only
these appropriation or public rights were subject to adjudication.
That is why not one underground water right was awarded or even
addressed in the Weber River Decree. Under that adjudication, only
water rights in the Weber River itself, or which were surface
tributary thereto, were subject to adjudication. It is not so much
a question of whether or not the Decree is or is not ambiguous.
The key to this case is whether the law as it existed during the
Weber River Adjudication contemplated that non-surface tributary
sources were or could have been adjudicated, and whether the
isolated springs here in question were surface tributary to the
Weber River (Appellants have conceded that they were not surface
tributary).
It should also be noted that the water rights claimed by
Appellee Kamas Hills Ltd. are not the only rights which will be
affected by this Court's decision. There are virtually hundreds of
diligence claims in the Weber River Drainage that will be impacted
by this Court's decision under the doctrine of stare decisis.

4

ARGUMENT
PREFACE
While the State Engineer is in agreement with the brief of our
Co-Appellee Kamas Hills Ltd., we feel compelled to file a separate
brief in this matter to advise the Court as to the specific
concerns of the State Engineer regarding Appellants1 action. These
concerns relate more generally to the evaluation of diligence
claims now or hereafter filed with the State Engineer within the
Weber

River

Drainage—particularly

in the

context

of

change

applications based on such diligence claims.
We firmly believe that Appellants1 intent in filing this
action is to obtain a court adjudication from which they will then
argue that all water diligence claims on springs in the Weber River
System filed after the Weber River Decree (and not covered therein)
are void because they are barred by said Decree.

Appellants also

seek a judicial declaration that the State Engineer does not have
the authority to evaluate or approve (or even to accept for filing)
change applications based on diligence claims in the Weber River
Drainage (R. 4) .

This, of course, causes the State Engineer a

great deal of concern.
Further, there are literally hundreds of diligence claims
within the Weber River drainage area covered by the Decree. While
none of these other water users are parties to this action, the
result sought by Appellants in this action will detrimentally
affect these other rights.

5

Hence, while we fully support Appellee Kamas Hills Ltd.'s
efforts to defend their specific diligence claims and the State
Engineer's approval of the change application based thereon, we
feel it necessary to file this separate brief to address more
general concerns.
POINT I:

A.

THE WEBER RIVER DECREE DID NOT PURPORT TO ADJUDICATE
ISOLATED SPRINGS OR UNDERGROUND SOURCES FEEDING THE
WEBER RIVER SYSTEM

Introduction
Let there be no mistake as to Appellants' intentions

bringing this action.

in

On its face, the Complaint seeks a reversal

of the State Engineer's decision granting the change application of
Appellee Kamas Hills Ltd., and further seeks a declaration that the
diligence claims on which the change is based are barred by the
Weber River Decree (R. 3 ) . The actual amount of water involved is
quite small.

We believe Appellants' real intention is to obtain a

ruling which would

indirectly

invalidate

all diligence

claims

within the area covered by the Weber River Decree.
In a nutshell, the position of the State Engineer is that the
Weber River Decree did not purport to adjudicate isolated springs
or underground

water

sources which were

not directly

surface

tributary to the "Weber River System" as defined in the Decree.
Further, the 1919 general adjudication statute did not cover such
rights.

If a source of water is surface tributary, we concede that

it would have been cut off by the Decree.

If it is not surface

tributary, the Decree would have no effect on such rights.

We

believe that in evaluating the numerous diligence claims in this
6

area—especially in the context of change applications—each claim
should be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or
not it is surface tributary, and thus affected by the Decree.
This point will explain why we feel the Decree did not cover
sources of water such as the isolated springs claimed by Kamas
Hills Ltd.

We will discuss the Decree, the uncertainties in the

law that existed at the time the Decree was entered, and other
relevant factors.
Finally, we feel that water rights such as those of Kamas
Hills Ltd.—which have been used for many years and which were
purchased in good faith as a part of the property—should not be
invalidated lightly, and only upon a clear demonstration that the
Weber River Decree is a bar to such claims.
B.

The Weber River Decree
The initial action leading up to the Weber River Decree was

filed on January 18, 1921, as Plain City Irrigation Co. v. Hooper
Irrigation Co., (Weber County Civil No. 7487).

It was immediately

converted to a general adjudication action in 1921, pursuant to
statute (Laws of Utah 1919, Ch. 67, § 20 et seq.) , but retained its
original case title. The final Decree was entered on June 2, 1937.
For reasons not relevant here, not all of the tributaries of
the Weber River were included in the adjudication action.

Water

rights on the Ogden River above its confluence with the Weber
River, and all tributaries "which flow into" the Weber River below
that confluence were excluded (Weber River Decree, p. 10, f 2, Exh.
3 0; Appendix A hereto).
7

Thus, the court had to define those geographic portions of the
Weber River which were and were not being adjudicated.

The area

being adjudicated was referred to in the Decree as the "Weber River
System".
merely

However, it is critical to note that the word "System"

referred

to the geographic

drainage—and

not

to the

hydrologic "system" feeding the River (this will be discussed in
more detail below).
Thus, in defining the portions of the Weber River which were
or were not included, the court specifically referred to "tributaries" (see Appendix A, J 2).
denotes

surface

water

The term "Weber River System" itself

tributaries:

i.e.,

all

surface

"flowing" to the Weber River or its tributaries.

water

Appellants

concede that the springs in question here are not surface tributary
to the Weber River

(Appellants1 Brief, p. 6), and it is our

contention that under the pre-1935 law such sources were not
intended to be—nor were they—adjudicated.
It is also clear that on its face the Decree did not purport
to adjudicate any underground sources of water such as wells. Not
one award of an underground source of water is found in the
Decree.l
Other references in the Decree itself support our contention
that it covered only surface tributaries.
1.

Paragraph 7, at pages 11 and 12 of the Decree (attached

hereto as Appendix A) defines the terms used in awarding the
1

After legislative amendments to the water code in 1935,
general adjudication actions now include both surface and underground sources.
8

various water rights in the heart of the Decree itself. The rights
awarded were defined in terms of "Flood" "High" and "Low" flows.
Such words are used in water jargon exclusively in terms of surface
flows in watercourses,
2.

It is uncontroverted that the Kamas Hills Springs are not

surface tributary to the Weber River System (Appellants1 Brief, p.
6) .

Again, paragraph 7 of the Decree contains some interesting

language.

For example, subparagraph (a) deals with the distribu-

tion of "Low Flow" rights under the Decree.

The relevant portion

of subparagraph (a) reads:
. . . the owners of said low water rights are entitled to
use and have distributed such quantities of water
available for use in such periods of low flow water as
set out in subparagraph 8-A hereof, except as to certain
rights, which are modified by [certain enumerated
paragraphs] hereof, and except as to any other rights to
the use of water, the water to fulfill which is from
springs or tributaries, which if shut off from supplying
them [the Decreed rights1, would not reach, and could not
be beneficially used by any owner of the right to use
water, whose right is prior in point of time.
(Emphasis added; see Appendix A).

Identical language is included

in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 7, which deal with "High"
and "Flood" flows, respectively.
The above-quoted language is significant in that it recognizes
and makes provision for springs and other tributaries that do not
contribute to the surface flow of the Weber River.

Such language

strongly supports our contention that the Weber River Decree
purported only to deal with water sources that were directly
surface tributary to the River or its tributaries.

Even as to

surface tributary rights, the court is saying that a junior
9

appropriator will not be shut off if his water source—if left
alone—would not reach the River on the surface and become part of
the supply for downstream senior appropriators.
Further, the above-quoted limitation is not just applicable to
rights adjudicated in the Decree.

The court uses the term "any

other rights to the use of water" in describing the exception.
This limitation is also in keeping with the general proposition of
law to the effect that an upstream junior user will not be forced
to shut off if the water in question will not reach the downstream
senior users' points of diversion.

See, e.g., Fuller v. Sharp, 33

Utah 431, 94 P. 813 (1908); Fenstermaker v. Jorgensen, 53 Utah 325,
178 P. 760 (1919); Washington v. Oregon. 297 U.S. 512, 522-523, 529
(1936); Mitchell Irr. Dist. v. Whiting, 59 Wyo. 52, 136 P. 502
(1943), cert, den. 322 U.S. 727 (1944); and Hutchins, Water Rights
Laws in the Nineteen Western States, Vol. 1, pp. 579-580 (1971).
Since it is conceded that the Kamas Hills Springs are not
surface tributary to the Weber River System, Paragraph 7 of the
Decree itself makes the Decree irrelevant so far as the rights of
Appellants—and also of Appellee Kamas Hills Ltd.—are concerned.
Further, the provisions of Paragraph 7 add strong weight to the
argument that the Decree itself did not purport to adjudicate
isolated springs not directly surface tributary to the River.
In its Findings of Fact, the lower court found "that the Weber
River Decree is not ambiguous as far as it goes", but the court
also found that the Decree does not extend as far as Appellants1
claims in this matter (Finding of Fact No. 15, R. 419; Emphasis
10

added). While we fully agree with this statement, this finding may
be slightly misleading.

The Decree itself is not ambiguous as to

the rights it awarded•

But, as will be shown in the next subsec-

tion, the ambiguity or uncertainty relates to what water sources
were adjudicated by the Decree because of the confused status of
Utah's water law at the time the Decree was adjudicated.
C.

Uncertainty of Utah Water Law at the Time the Weber River
Adjudication was Begun and Adjudicated
Our position is that the Weber River Decree did not purport to

adjudicate isolated springs or underground water sources, and that
the Kamas Hills Springs do not fall within the category of water
rights so adjudicated.

In sum, this and the following subpoints

will discuss: (1) the uncertainty of Utah water law during the
pendency of the action resulting in the Weber River Decree; (2) the
general adjudication statutes in effect at that time purportedly
only covered "appropriative" rights and that Kamas Hills Ltd.'s
claims were not initiated as appropriative rights; (3) that because
of the uncertainty of the general water laws and the adjudication
statutes, the predecessor of Kamas Hills Ltd. could not have had
valid notice of whether the rights in the Kamas Hills Springs were
being adjudicated.

In fact, we will demonstrate that even the

State Engineer was uncertain and issued a disclaimer to that effect
in his Proposed Determination of Water Rights submitted to the
court.

11

In light of these factors, Appellants1 assertion that the
Weber River Decree foreclosed all types of claims to water use in
the Weber River System simply cannot stand.
!•

Utah Water Law Prior to 1935
As stated above, the Weber River Adjudication was begun

and converted to a general adjudication action in 1921, and the
Decree was entered in 1937.

Major changes in Utah's water law—

both statutory and caselaw—were occurring during the pendency of
the Weber River Adjudication.

While it is difficult to trace all

of the history involved in the space limitations of this brief, we
will give it a shot.
Attorneys and judges today are accustomed to thinking of all
water in Utah (both surface and underground) as being the property
of the public. Indeed, that is what the present statute declares.
See § 73-1-1, Utah Code Ann. Further, we have come to accept that
appropriation of this public water to a private use may only be
accomplished through filing an application to do so with the State
Engineer.

See § 73-3-1, Utah Code Ann.

But that was not always the case.
all waters were considered

"public11.

Under early Utah law, not
See, e.g. , Riordan v.

Westwood, 115 Utah 215, 203 P.2d 922, 924-28 (1949). Certain water
sources were considered to be "private" as a physical attribute of
the land and, as such, were not deemed subject to appropriation.
In other words, certain water sources were deemed to be owned by
the landowner and he or she did not have to appropriate the water
from the State.

The law in this area began active evolvement
12

around the turn of the century and culminated in 1935 (two years
prior to the final Weber River Decree) with a statutory amendment
and the case of Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755
(1935) .
But, let us start at the beginning with springs, since that is
what is at issue in this action.
basically two types of springs.

Early Utah caselaw recognized

The first are springs which flow

in such amounts or under such conditions that the waters therefrom
form a watercourse or "spring creek" which is directly tributary to
a river system on the surface.2

As to these types of springs,

there is no doubt that they constitute a surface, tributary source
of supply and have therefore always been owned by the public and
subject to the laws of appropriation; and downstream users on the
river are entitled to rely on such springs as a source of supply.
Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 P. 1092 (1916).
However, there is another type of spring—of which the Kamas
Hills Springs are an example.

These are springs which issue from

the ground, flow a short ways on the surface, and again sink into
the ground without ever reaching any watercourse which is tributary
to a larger surface drainage system.
The early rule adopted by this Court was that if such a spring
arose on private property and disappeared before it left the
property, it was owned by the owner of that land and was not

The Court may be familiar with Cascade Springs above Heber
Valley, which form the major source of flow in Little Deer Creek—
which is a perennial flowing stream entering the Provo River just
below Deer Creek Dam in Provo Canyon.
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subject to appropriation by others.

Or, stated differently, the

owner of the land did not need to appropriate the water from the
State, since he or she owned it as a part of the land.

Willow

Creek Irr. Co. v. Michaelson, 21 Utah 248, 60 P. 943 (1900); and
Peterson v. Eureka Hill Mining Co., 53 Utah 70, 176 P. 729 (1918) .3
In Deseret Livestock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 38, 239 P. 479
(1925),

this

Court

stated:

"The waters

of

the

springs

are

therefore percolating waters and if such springs are located on
private lands the waters arising therefrom are not subject to
appropriation."4
The caselaw at that time in other Western States was generally
in accord.

See Jones v. Mclntire, 66 Idaho 338, 91 P. 2d 373

(1939); Ma cher v. Gentry, 67 Idaho 559, 186 P.2d

870

(1947);

Southern Pac. R.R. v. Dufour, 95 Cal. 613, 30 P. 783 (1892); York
v. Horn, 154 Cal.App.2d 209, 315 P.2d 912 (1957); White v. Rose
Land & Cattle Co., 61 Colo. 352, 157 P. 1164

(1916); Haver v.

Matonock, 79 Colo. 194, 244 P. 914 (1926); and Beisell v. Wood, 186
Or. 66, 185 P. 2d 570 (1947) . The most recent treatise on water law
states the old rule as follows:

". . . . spring water that did not

create a stream or contribute water to a stream was treated as
diffused surface water which could not be appropriated."

Waters

and Water Rights, Michie Company, Vol. 2, § 13.02(C) (2) (1991 Edition) .
3

A slightly different rule applied to such springs located
on the public domain. See, Patterson v. Ryan, 37 Utah 410, 108 P.
1118 (1910).
4

Whether or not such waters were subject to the appropriation
process is critical when we examine the nature and extent of the
1919 General Adjudication statutes, infra.
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A similar rule of private ownership applied to percolating
groundwater prior to the 1935 statutory amendments.
the Utah

courts

applied

appropriation

law

only

Originally,
to

definite

underground streams and the underflow of surface streams (the water
flowing immediately below the surface of defined watercourses).
Chandler v. Utah Copper Co., 43 Utah 479, 135 P. 106 (1913).
However, percolating groundwater in aquifers was considered to
belong to the owner of the soil as part of his or her ownership of
the land.

Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. Michaelson, supra.

In the

early 1920's, the doctrine of correlative rights was judicially
adopted, entitling each landowner to use percolating groundwater in
proportion to his surface ownership of land. See H o m e v. Utah Oil
Refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 P. 815 (1921).

However, the right

to use percolating groundwater was still considered to be a private
right, not subject to the laws of appropriation.
In 1935, this Court abandoned the correlative rights doctrine
and ruled that percolating groundwater was subject to the appropriation doctrine.
the

legislature

See Wrathall v. Johnson, supra.
passed

the water

That same year,

code amendments

(currently

codified as § 73-3-1) providing that groundwater could only be
appropriated by filing an application with the State Engineer.

A

recent treatise on water law discusses the uncertainty caused by
the 1935 shift in Utah's water laws:
When the Utah Supreme Court abandoned the correlative
rights rule, they needed the promptly forthcoming help of
the Utah Legislature. Even so, much subsequent litigation has been forthcoming concerning appropriations made
15

in groundwater prior to 1935 when no one could have
known, if they relied on then current Utah law, that
appropriative rights could be established in groundwater.
(Waters and Water Rights, Michie Company, Vol. 3, § 24.01(a) at p.
397 (1991 Edition); Emphasis added).

See also Hanson v. Salt Lake

City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949).

The uncertainty these

developments caused among attorneys is clearly demonstrated by two
articles in the old Utah Bar Bulletin.

See:

Ullrich, Underground

Water Rights in Utah, Utah Bar Bulletin, Vol. VI, No. 7, p. 93
(July 1936), and Skeen, Recent Amendments to Utah Water Laws, Utah
Bar Bulletin, Vol. XII, Nos. 1 & 2, p. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1942).
We mention percolating groundwater to demonstrate that the
Utah laws regarding both non-tributary

springs and percolating

groundwater were all in a state of flux just prior to 1935 and
right in the middle of the Weber River Adjudication process.

The

uncertainty this created for water users in the Weber River System
will be discussed

in more detail below.

Further, we see no

appreciable difference between percolating groundwater and springs
such as the Kamas Hills Springs, which may be part of the general
groundwater

system

feeding

the Weber

River—although

geologic

conditions may cause the groundwater to flow on the surface at a
certain point for a short distance (see, generally, Testimony of
Bryce Montgomery, Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 47 et seq.).
2.

The 1919 General Adjudication Statute
As

stated

above,

the

Weber

River

Adjudication

was

converted from a private action to a general adjudication action in
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1921.

As such, the adjudication was subject to the general

adjudication statutes then in effect (Laws of Utah 1919, Ch. 67,
§§ 20-40).

That law was enacted in 1919, and a copy is attached

hereto as Appendix B.
In the preceding sub-point, we have demonstrated that the laws
on non-tributary

springs and percolating groundwater as they

existed in the 1920's provided that such water sources were not
subi ect to the law of appropriation—but rather were treated as
private rights in those water sources. The 1919 general adjudication statute is relevant because at that time the general adjudication process only applied to appropriative water rights and not to
any water rights held privately as a part of land ownership.
To be sure, the 1919 law does not expressly say that only
appropriative rights are covered, but a reading of key sections of
that law makes that intent clear.

For example, § 23 provides for

the service of notice on water users.
effect as a summons.

Such notice has the same

Section 23 provides in part:

The clerk of said court shall . . . mail, by registered
letter to each [claimant] as are known, a copy of said
notice, and a blank form on which said claimant shall
present in writing . . . all the particulars relating to
the appropriation of the water of said river system or
water source to which he lays claim.
(Appendix B, p. B-8; Emphasis added).
Section 24 of the 1919 law sets forth the form and information
to be provided to the court clerk. That information is to include:
"the nature of the use on which the claim of appropriation is based
. . . ." (Emphasis added).
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Thus the statute clearly contemplated that notice was only to
be given to those water users claiming appropriative rights—and
did not include those claiming rights to use water under private
rights recognized under the then existing laws.
At best, the 1919 statute only authorized the adjudication of
appropriative water rights, and did not grant the Courts jurisdiction to address claims to water based on land ownership where it
was not necessary to appropriate the water. At the very least, the
1919 statute (given the state of the then-present law relating to
non-tributary springs and percolating waters) could have created a
very real uncertainty in the minds of water users as to whether
they were or were not obligated to file a claim with the clerk in
order to preserve a private non-appropriative claim to water.
We will now proceed to discuss the actual uncertainties these
laws created at the time the Weber River Adjudication was begun.
D.

Uncertainty by the State Engineer
Aside from any uncertainty in the minds of water users, the

State Engineer himself was unclear as to whether certain water
sources within the geographical area of the "Weber River System"
should be included in the adjudication.
Sections 28 and 32 of the 1919 general adjudication statute
(Appendix B hereto) provide that upon receipt of water user's
claims, the State Engineer is to tabulate the claims, conduct
surveys and investigations as necessary, and prepare a "Proposed
Determination" of water rights for consideration by the court.
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This was done by the State Engineer, and hydrographic maps
detailing claimed sources and irrigated acres were prepared.
On August 1, 1924, the State Engineer submitted his Proposed
Determination to the court and to the water users. In Section VIII
of the Proposed Determination

(Exh. 39, p. 263; copy attached

hereto as Appendix C), the State Engineer stated:
Certain lands in this State have enjoyed some benefits
from the application of water thereto by other than
diversion from natural channels or sources, such for
instance, as natural swamps or meadow lands watered from
over flow, seepage water, etc.
The Statutes appear not to point the way sufficient to
enable the State Engineer certainly to determine water
rights with respect to these classes of lands and no
determination, therefore, is made with respect to them.
The tabulation separately shown hereafter shows facts as
to these lands and water uses, such as dates of priority,
points of collection, general location and such other
data as may enable the court to determine the status of
these uses.
(Emphasis added). Thus, the State Engineer himself was confused as
to whether certain water sources should be included in the Decree,
and he chose to make no determination as to those rights.5
The testimony of Edwin J. Skeen, who was the attorney for the
State Engineer from 1936 to 1945, established that the State
Engineer—for the period immediately after the Decree was entered—

5

The Weber River Decree makes no declaration as to whether
the questionable water sources were considered to be adjudicated.
And as pointed out by Appellants (see Appellants1 Brief, p. 5, n.
1), the records of the court proceedings leading up to the Weber
River Decree have unfortunately been lost or misplaced without
being microfilmed. It is therefore impossible to ascertain the
trial court's final disposition with regard to the adjudication of
the types of sources identified in § VIII of the Proposed Determination.
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interpreted the Weber River Decree as not covering isolated springs
in the Weber River Drainage (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 167).
Of further note is that the adjudication map prepared by the
State Engineer for the Weber River Adjudication covering the area
of the Kamas Hills Springs is in evidence (see Adjudication Map No.
47, Exh. 29; Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 193-94).

That map—as others in the

adjudication mapping process—was a result of the State Engineerfs
surveys to determine sources of water and irrigated acreage (see §§
22 and 28 of the 1919 general adjudication statute attached hereto
as Appendix B, pp. B-8 and B-10) .

On that map, no irrigated

acreage or water sources whatsoever are shown on the Kamas Hills
Ltd. property above the so-called Upper Marion Ditch (see Testimony
of Jim Riley, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 194) . While no definitive conclusions
can be drawn from the absence of any survey above the Upper Marion
Ditch, it is at least conceivable that the reason the area was not
surveyed is because the State Engineer may have known the Kamas
Hills Springs were there but did not consider them to be part of
the adjudication; or, that the State Engineer or his surveyor
simply was unaware of the location of the springs.
E.

Uncertainty for Water Users of Isolated Springs
Perhaps the most important point is what was in the minds of

the many water users of isolated springs when the Weber River
Decree was adjudicated.

These people were, in retrospect, placed

in a difficult position as to whether they had to file a claim in
the Weber River adjudication in order to preserve it.
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As to users of wells or other underground sources of water, it
is clear that underground water rights were not being adjudicated.
To the best of our knowledge, nothing in the Decree so indicated—
nor are any underground rights awarded in the Decree or mentioned
in the State Engineer's Proposed Determination. But it was not so
easy for users of isolated springs which were not surface tributary
to the Weber River System,6
In this respect, we would ask the Court to try and place
itself in the mind of a water user of an isolated spring in the
early 1920's. Perhaps you received a notice from the court clerk.
Perhaps you did not, but read the notice of the action in the
newspaper.

But the law at that time (e.g., Deseret Livestock v.

Hooppiania, supra) stated that you privately owned any spring on
your land that seeped back into the earth before it left your
property.

You and your precedessors always used the spring for

irrigation, culinary or stockwatering purposes.

You never made

application to the State Engineer to use the water, and probably
nobody ever questioned your right to use the water.
Since, under the existing law, you owned the water outright
(as opposed to obtaining the right to use the Statef s water), you
would not be subject to other rights in the system. Priority dates
would be irrelevant because downstream users were not entitled to
rely on your spring as a specific source of supply since it was not

Because the Weber River Decree court records are lost or
misplaced (see n.5, supra), it is impossible to determine if any
individual filed a claim which the court disallowed, or whether no
claim was filed.
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surface tributary. This type of private water right simply did not
fit into the prior appropriation system according to the law.
Perhaps you went to Salt Lake City and read the general
adjudication statute (Appendix B hereto).

And it said that the

general adjudication process applied only to appropriative rights.
WOULD YOU HAVE FILED A CLAIM? Maybe, maybe not. The point is that
in the 1920's the law—both as to appropriative versus private
rights and the statute itself—created legitimate doubts as to
whether or not such rights were covered by the general adjudication
process.

Our position is that because of that legitimate uncer-

tainty, rights such as those of Kamas Hills Ltd. should not be
deemed to be barred by the Decree simply because the Decree is
"there" and the right is not included therein.
It also makes sense that after the laws were changed in 1935
declaring all waters to be public and subject to the appropriation
doctrine, the owners of isolated springs would avail themselves of
the diligence claim statute enacted in 1943 (§ 73-5-13) to document
their claims with the State Engineer.
But, you say, Appellants produced evidence at trial that many
users of isolated springs did indeed submit claims on "isolated
springs"7 and those rights were included in the Decree.
Our response to that again demonstrates the uncertainties
existing at that time.

It seems reasonable that some users of

isolated springs may have been more cautious than others—or
7

However, there was no concrete evidence that any of these
other springs were or were not surface tributary to the Weber River
System.
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perhaps they or their attorney had a different legal interpretation
of Utah law as it then existed.

It is undisputed that some users

of springs filed claims and some did not.

Those claims that were

filed were generally included in the Decree.8

But it does not

logically follow that just because some overly cautious water users
filed claims, those who did not file claims had their rights cut
off by the Decree. The number of diligence claims on file with the
State Engineer which were not included in the Decree is just as
persuasive that such rights were not intended to be adjudicated.
At trial, computer print-outs from the State Engineer's office were
introduced showing that there are hundreds of diligence claims on
file with the State Engineer in the Weber River System that are not
recognized in the Decree (see Exhs. 32, 33 and 34; Tr. Vol. 1, p.
201; see also Testimony of Stanley Green, Tr. Vol. 2, p. 45).
At this point it seems appropriate to discuss briefly the
effect of this action on the multitude of other diligence claims
listed in Exhibits 32-34.

The owners of these claims are not

parties to this action, and technically are not bound by any
judgment herein. However, if this Court were to adopt Appellants'
theory that as a matter of law the Weber River Decree constitutes
a bar to all later diligence claims in the Weber River System (see
Appellants' Brief, p. 1, Issues Presented for Review), the effect
would be to render all these other claims invalid for all practical
purposes under principles of stare decisis.
8

This is so regardless of the fact that the 1919 general
adjudication statutes may not have conferred jurisdiction to
adjudicate such claims. See discussion supra, at pp. 16-18.
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Further, to adopt Appellants' argument that all such diligence
claims are barred by the Weber River Decree would, in effect,
preclude the State Engineer from approving any change applications
based on such diligence claims.

This is exactly what Appellants

want and is—we submit—the real reason they filed this lawsuit
(see Complaint, R. 1-9) . The trial court did not believe the Weber
River Decree went that far, and we don't either.9
In conclusion, a claim to water rights should not be invalidated lightly.

In view of the state of the law which existed at

the time the Weber River Adjudication was being prosecuted, and
absent any specific language in the Decree that all claims on nontributary isolated springs were being adjudicated, we urge that the
diligence claims should be given the benefit of the doubt and
upheld—especially since § 73-5-13, Utah Code Ann., provides that
diligence claims filed with the State Engineer are prima facie
evidence of the right.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THE SPRINGS IN
ISSUE WERE NOT TRIBUTARY TO THE WEBER RIVER, AND IF ANY
ERROR DID OCCUR IT WAS HARMLESS
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in concluding
that the evidence was insufficient to show that the waters of the
Kamas Hills Springs were tributary to the Weber River System.
disagree.

We

As demonstrated in Point I above, we believe the sole

issue in this case is whether the diligence claims of Kamas Hills

9

Should the Court nevertheless agree with Appellants, we
would respectfully suggest that the Court expressly limit the
precedential effect of the decision to this case only.
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Ltd. are or are not barred by the Weber River Decree.

As to that

issue, we believe (for the reasons set forth above) that the only
relevant factual issue is whether the springs in question were
surface tributary to the Weber River or its tributaries.

Since

Appellants have conceded this fact, (see Appellants' Brief, p. 6) ,
there is no point in rehashing the uncontroverted testimony of
virtually all the technical witnesses that the springs were indeed
not surface tributary. The trial court expressly found in its oral
ruling that there were no surface channels from the springs to the
Weber River (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 5).
However, Appellants insist that once the spring water seeps
back into the ground (which every technical witness said it does),
it becomes part of the underground percolating flow that eventually
may find its way to the Weber River. While there is some general
evidence that this takes place, there is certainly no specific
evidence in the record as to how, when, or where it occurs.
However, for the purposes of this argument, we will assume,
arguendo, that after seeping back into the ground the waters of the
Kamas Hills Springs do eventually find their way through underground percolation to the Weber River.

But that fact—even if

true—doesn't help Appellants one iota.

They continue to ignore

Utah water law as it existed prior to 1935—that percolating
groundwater was not subject to the appropriation doctrine.
Appellants argue in Point II of their brief that just because
the Kamas Hills Springs make a brief appearance on the surface they
were intended to be covered by the Weber River Decree. That is not
25

correct.

In Point I above, we demonstrated that under Utah water

law as it existed up to 1935 isolated springs such as these were
not considered to be public waters subject to appropriation, but
were privately owned by the owner of the land on which they arose
(see discussion supra at pp. 12-16).
to percolating groundwater.

The same principles applied

At the time of the Decree, isolated

springs and percolating waters were not part of the appropriation
doctrine and could not be relied on as a source for downstream
appropriative rights even if they were in fact hydrologically
connected (via the underground) to the Weber River. So Appellants1
artificial distinction between percolating water that momentarily
flows on the surface (i.e., isolated springs) and normal percolating groundwater takes you nowhere and makes no sense, especially
where Appellants assert the distinction to bring such water sources
within the purview of the Weber River Decree.
Appellants cite several cases on page 14 of their brief for
the proposition that (1) downstream appropriators have a right to
rely on all sources (surface and underground) above their point of
diversion and (2) there is a presumption that all surface and
underground sources are tributary to the drainage in which they are
geographically located. While we have no general disagreement with
the holdings of the cases cited by Appellants, they are simply
inapplicable to the issue to be decided here. Again, the law prior
to 1935 was that groundwater and isolated springs were privately
owned and were not subject to the appropriation doctrine or the
priority system.

Again, that is why not one underground water
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right is addressed or mentioned in the Weber River Decree.

Thus,

whether or not the Kamas Hills Springs contributed to a percolating
groundwater aquifer reaching the Weber River was totally irrelevant
under the law as it existed prior to 1935.
For example, the lengthy quote from the 1935 case of Richlands
Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Co., 80 P.2d 458 (Utah 1938),
cited at page 14 of Appellants' brief regarding all sources feeding
a senior appropriator's source of supply is certainly the law
today.

But that was not the law prior to 1935—at least not as to

isolated springs and groundwater.
Further, Appellants offered no evidence to demonstrate that
percolating underground water from the Kamas Hills Springs would
reach the Weber River above their point of diversion, or at a time
when Appellants were allowed to divert water.
demonstration of harm to Appellants.

Thus, there is no

Nor is there any evidence

that such water would reach the Weber River at a time when
Appellants are entitled to divert.
Little Cottonwood Water Company v. Sandy City, 258 P.2d 440
(Utah 1953),

(see Appellants1 brief, p. 14), is inapplicable

because it involved the appropriation process before the State
Engineer and whether there was unappropriated water in Little
Cottonwood Creek—a totally different situation than this case.
The arguments and citations in Point II of Appellants' brief
further confuse issues of interference with the issue of whether
isolated springs were or could have been adjudicated by the Weber
River Decree.

The two concepts are totally separate.
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Appellants argue throughout their brief that the use of the
term "Weber River System" in the Weber River Decree defined the
hydrologic system as including all subsurface sources feeding the
Weber River, and that all such sources were adjudicated (see, e.g. ,
Appellants' brief, pp. 12 and 15).

If that were true, why are

there no underground or well rights listed in the Decree? The fact
is that in defining the "Weber River System", the court was setting
forth the geographical boundaries of the adjudication, since the
Ogden River and other selected tributaries were excluded (see
Appendix A).

The court did not intend the term "River System" to

refer to the hydrologic system of water which feeds the Weber
River. And, even if it did, we submit there would be no logical or
common

sense

reason

for

the

court

to differentiate

between

percolating groundwater wells (which were clearly left out) and
isolated springs, given the state of the law prior to 1935.
Let us again make clear the position of the State Engineer.
If a spring or other source of water was surface tributary to the
Weber River, it was "public water" under the pre-1935 law; it was
subject to the appropriation doctrine and it was covered by the
Weber River Decree. If the water source was not surface tributary,
under the pre-1935 law it was privately owned; it was not covered
by the Decree, and it could not have been legally relied upon as a
source of supply by downstream senior appropriators.10 The law as
it exists today cannot be superimposed back to 1935 retroactively

10

We, of course, acknowledge that all of this changed in

1935.
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to bar claims to the use of water which were, prior to 1935, under
a different legal regime.
The key to this case is whether or not the Kamas Hills Springs
were surface tributary.

Since Appellants have conceded that the

springs are not surface tributary to the Weber River, the lower
court's finding that the evidence did not support a finding that
the springs were not tributary in any sense (surface or underground) is simply irrelevant.11
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we urge the Court to affirm the
judgment of the court below.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of June, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

/JyLPA
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Assistant Attor'
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11

As already noted, in its oral ruling the trial court did
find that the springs were not surface tributary (Tr. Vol. 3, p.
5).
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Ifahti unmhnrod 101, ?ry, m a n r i Yd! t n tiXihii.nminfifnad lit ti tntnl nf g nomad
fefct until the flow of the creek reaches 12 second feet, after which time, as
the^low of the Creek diminishes, two-thirds of the flow is to go to rights
numbered 191, 232, 221 and 241, and the remaining one-third of the flow to rights
numbered 140,167, 209, 219 and 238.
(f ) \ T h a t Union Pacific Railroad Company, No. 211, Morgan City Corporation
No. 2 5 6 , \ n d the Utah Packing Corporation No. 257 may, at times when the
direct flowWof the Robinson Springs is not being used by the owners thereof,
store the excess water of the Robinson Springs in a reservoir which is already
constructed aiki now owned by them, for the purpose of permitting the owners
of these rightsVa draft therefrom in excess of the continuous flow hereinafter
set out to them 1W the Tabulation of water rights.
(g) Nothing\erein contained shall prejudice the rights of George J. Stahle
in the contest nowV>ending herein between the said Stahle and A. L. Hurley
and Rhea Hurley, 8ta wife, their final rights to be determined by a final
decree in said pendinjrourotest proceedings, provided, however, said decree shall
in no wise affect any other rights or priorities than those of the said Stahle
and the said Hurleys.
\
14. That the expense s\incurred in the preparation of the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and jucqrment and decree herein and the printing of the
same as determined by the committee, petitioners herein, and approved by the
court, shall be assessed againsV the persons, firms, associations or corporations
entitled to the use of the water of said system, as set out in the findings of fact
and the judgment and decree herein, in proportion to their rights as therein
set out, upon the same basis as toe expenses of the distribution of the water
of said system are assessed by the State Engineer, and such expenses shall be
and constitute a first lien upon said%rater rights until paid, and if the same
are not paid within three months afterVthe entry of the judgment and* decree
herein and the tabulation thereof, with the^pproval of the court, and the mailing
of notices of such assessment, the same shall be sold by the Sheriff of Weber
County as upon execution, except that there shall be no right of redemption,
and the balance, if any, of the proceeds ofVale, after paying such expenses,
shall be delivered by the Sheriff to the owners^f said rights.
CONCLUSIONS OP L W
As conclusions of law from the foregoing factsVind the stipulation of all
the claimants to the right to the use of water of said Weber River System,
other than the users upon the Ogden River above its junction with the Weber
River and also other than those users who have rightk upon the tributaries
and streams which flow into the Weber River from the \ a r t h side below said
junction, and wherever herein the term Weber River Sysoun is used it shall
be construed to mean and does mean said system as abovevimited, the court
makes and files the following conclusions of law:
\
1. That all of said claimants are entitled to the judgmen\and decree of
this court, that each of them is entitled to use the water as set out in the
tabulation of water rights of Weber River and tributaries, as heNteinafter set
out, subject to the limitations set out in paragraphs numbered 7, 8 , \ 10 11, 12
and 13 and all of the subdivisions of any of said paragraphs, of the fWlmgs 0 f
fact herein.
\
2. That each of the users entitled to use the water of said Weber^Etiver
System, as set out in said Tabulation hereinafter made, and all persons, sfrms,
associations, and corporations claiming by, under or through them and fl^eir
agents, servants and employees, and all other persons, firms, associations a\ad

[10]

*A«a*i4 syteaai ac faoyein •adjudiiatcdr QM8opfr«oo«fch«pe«i etti uufe, and as llinitt*
b ^ c a i d findings of fact numbered 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, and all of th<
subdivisions of any of said paragraphs of the findings of fact herein, and fron
interfeMgrwith the use of any of the water of said Weber River System, a:
hereinbefores^et out, which any other user is entitled to use, as set out in saic
Tabulation anoSas limited by said findings of fact numbered 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1!
and 13 and all ors^he subdivisions of any of said paragraphs of the finding?
of fact herein.
^v
3. That the expens^*incurred in the preparation of the findings of fact
conclusions of law and juti&nent and decree herein and the printing of the
same as determined by the committee, petitioners herein, and approved by the
court, shall be assessed against rhe persons, firms, associations or corporations
entitled to the use of the water oxSaid system, as set out in the findings of
fact and the judgment and decree herein, in proportion to their rights as
therein set out; upon the same basis as thVexpenses of the distribution of the
water of said system are assessed by the St»|e Engineer, and such expenses
shall be and constitute a first lien upon said water rights, until paid, and if
the same are not paid within three months after thV^ntry of the judgment and
decree herein and the tabulation thereof, with the approval of the court, and
the mailing of notices of such assessment, the same shall Da^sold by the Sheriff
of Weber County as upon execution, except that there shalLbe no right of
redemption, and the balance, if any, of the proceeds of sale, arttor paying such
expenses, shall be delivered by the Sheriff to the owners of said rigraa.
Dated June 2nd, 1937.
• • ••
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JUDGMENT AND DECREE
And the court having made and filed its decision in writing, wherein the
findings of fact and conclusions of law are separately stated, upon said findings
of fact and conclusions of law and the stipulation of all the claimants to the
right to the use of water of said Weber River System other than the users upon
the Ogden River above its junction with the Weber River and also other than
those users who have rights upon the tributaries and streams which flow into
the Weber River from the north side below said junction, and wherever herein
the term Weber River System is used it shall be construed to mean and does
mean said system as above limited:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That in accordance with Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919, as amended,
all the proceedings have been had in this action and all the steps have been
taken to enable the court to finally adjudicate all the rights to the use of water
of said system.
2. That the parties hereto and as set out in the Tabulation of Water Rights
of Weber River and Tributaries, hereinafter made herein, and hereby referred
to and by this reference made a part hereof, are all those entitled to the right to
the use for any purpose of water from the Weber River System, other than the
users upon the Ogden River above its junction with the Weber River and also
other than those who have rights upon tributaries or streams which flow into the
Weber River System from the north side below said junction, and wherever herein
the term "Weber River System" is used, it shall be construed to mean and does
mean said system as above limited.
3. That as a means of studying the rights of the users of the water of the
Weber River System, and as set forth in said Proposed Determination, the water
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users have made three divisions of the River System,—the Upper Weber River,
the Central Weber River and the lower Weber River; that a general committee
of five members, chosen by the three divisions, with the Water Commissioner as
secretary, has formed and does now form what is known as the Weber River
Adjudication Committee, which committee represents, has acted for and now
acts for the entire Weber River System, in all matters pertaining to the operation
of said Proposed Determination.
4. That on March 11, 1935, the Central Division at Morgan, on March 12,
1935, the Upper Division at Oakley, and on April 10, 1935, the Lower Division
at Ogden, the water users met in regularly called meetings, at which times
proposed changes in and modifications of the State Engineer's Proposed
Determination as heretofore set out herein were discussed and unanimously
approved.
5. That the State Engineer's Proposed Determination of the water rights of
the Weber River System was modified and revised in many instances and
particulars by the orders of this court made in this matter on June 30, 1931,
August 4, 1933, and June 27, 1935.
6. That sufficient trial periods have now been had to enable the court,
except as hereinafter specifically stated, to make and enter a final decree
adjudicating all the rights to the use of the waters of the said System and in
accordance with said Proposed Determination, as modified and revised in
accordance with the modifications and revisions thereof, which have heretofore
been made in accordance with the orders of the court above set out and .have
since been made as set out in said petition and as hereinafter specifically set
out, and that it is to the best interests of all the water users of said system that
the court make and enter its final decree herein, in accordance with said
Proposed Determination, as modified and revised, as hereinafter specifically
set out, and in accordance with the decrees as to particular rights made and
entered in this cause since its commencement, and in accordance with the decree
made and entered by the District Court of the United States for the District
of Utah, Northern Division, in the cause entitled Ogden City, a municipal
corporation, vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, in Equity No. 278, as hereinafter
set out.
7. That in the Tabulation of Water Rights of Weber River and Tributaries
hereinafter made herein, which said tabulation is hereby referred to and by
this reference made a part hereof, is set out the number of each right to the use
of the water of said system, as herein adjudicated, in the case of rights initiated
since 1903 the number on which the application is based, in the case of rights
which have been perfected since 1903 the number of the certificate which has
been issued evidencing such right, the date of priority, the name of the owner of
the right, and the name of the ditch through which the water represented by
the right is diverted, the point of diversion, by section, township and range (for
a more particular description of the point of diversion reference is hereby
made to the statements of the respective claimants on file herein), the
period of use, the purpose of the use of the right, in the case of water used
for the purpose of irrigation, the section of the land irrigated, and the number
of acres irrigated, the water allotment of the right in second feet in "Flood,"
"High," and "Low" water, with such reference and remarks as will clarify
the nature and extent of the right and its relation to other rights on the said
system.
Note: The letters and figures preceding the number and other symbols in
the column "Right No." are for reference only and are not to be construed to be
any part of the number of the right.
That as used in said Tabulation wherein the "Water Allotments in Second
Feet" are divided into three columns, designated "Flood," "High," and "Low,"
said terms shall be construed to and do refer to flood water rights, high water

rights and low water rights and said terms are defined to have and shall be
construed to have and do have the following meanings:
(a) Whenever during any period of time in any irrigation season there is
only sufficient water or less, other than storage water, available in the said
System to supply the "Low" water rights, the quantities of which are set out
in the column designated "Low," such periods of time are hereby designated
as and are low water periods, and said System during said periods is considered
to be and is at low water stage. During such periods of low water, the maximum
quantity of water, other than storage water, which any owner having a low
water right, as set out in said Tabulation, has the right to use, is the quantity,
other than storage water, stated in the column designated "Low," and the owners
of said low water rights are entitled to use and have distributed to them such
quantities of water available for use in such periods of low water as set out in
subparagraph 8-A hereof, except as to certain rights, which are modified by
paragraphs 11, 12, 13a, 13b, 13d and 13e hereof, and except as to any other
rights to the use of water, the water to fulfill which is from springs or tributaries
which, if shut off from supplying them, would not reach, and could not be
beneficially used by any other owner of the right to use water, whose right is
prior in point of time.
(b) Whenever during any period of time in any irrigation season there is
sufficient water, other than storage water, available in said system to make
up the difference, or any part thereof, between the quantity designated as "Low"
in the columns opposite the names of the users as set out in said Tabulation,
and the quantities of water set out in the columns designated as "High," such
periods are hereby designated as and are high water periods, and the said
System during said periods is considered to be and is at high water stage. The
maximum quantity of water which any user having a high water right, designated
in said Tabulation as "High," may use, if any, during a high water period of
said System, is the quantity of water set opposite his name in the column of
said Tabulation designated as "High." However, the owners of rights to "High"
water, available for use and distribution, as above defined, are entitled to
and shall have distributed to them such water, other than storage water, only
in the order of their respective priorities, as set out in subparagraph 8-A
hereof, except as to those owners of the right to use said "High" water,
whose rights are modified by paragraphs 9, 10, 13a, 13b, 13d and 13e hereof,
and except as to any other owners of the right to use said "High" water, the
water to fulfill which is from springs or tributaries which, if shut off from
supplying them, would not reach and could not be beneficially used by any
other owners of the right to use said water, whose rights are prior in point of
time.
(c) Whenever during any part of the irrigation season there is sufficient
water, other than storage water, available in said System to make up the
difference, or any part thereof, between the quantity of water designated as
"High" in the column set opposite the names of the users in said Tabulation
and the quantities of water designated as "Flood," such periods of time are
hereby designated as flood water periods, and the said System during said periods
is considered to be and is at flood water stage. The quantity of water, other
than storage water, which any owner of the right to use flood water designated
as "Flood" in said Tabulation, may use, if any, during a flood water period
of said system, is the quantity of water set opposite his name in the column of
said Tabulation designated as "Flood."
However, the owners of the right to use flood water, available for use
and distribution, other than storage water, are entitled to use and shall have
distributed to them such water only in the order of their respective priorities,
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as set out in subparagraph 8-A hereof, except as to certain owners of such
rights, whose rights are modified by paragraphs 13a and 13b hereof, and except
as to those owners of the right to use such flood water, the water to fulfill which
is from springs or tributaries which, if cut off from supplying them, would
not reach and could not be beneficially used by other owners of the right to use
said water, whose rights are prior in point of time.
(d) Whenever in said Tabulation the term "supplemental" is used, it
shall be construed to mean and does mean that the owner of such right has an
additional source of supply to fulfill his right, as therein set out, but in no
case shall the water which is available for such right from its original source
of supply and its additional source of supply (or either thereof) be more
than the total amount which is set out in the "Flood," "High" and "Low"
columns opposite his name in the respective periods of such water, as herein
defined, except as to storage water, and except where the term is used in
connection with rights Numbered 41 and 42, in which cases the term is to be
construed to have and does have the meaning given it in the references in the
columns so designated opposite said rights.
(e) The abbreviations of words and terms used in said Tabulation are
to be construed to stand for and be in lieu of complete words or terms, as
follows: Dom. for Domestic, Stk. for Stock, Irr. for Irrigation, Apprx, for
Approximately, S e c or Sees, for Section or Sections, T for Township, R for
Range, N. for North, S. for South, E. for East, W. for West, A c Ft. for Acre
Feet, S e c Ft* for Second Feet, No. or Nos^ # or # s for Number or Numbers.
8-A. That in order to conform to the best and most satisfactory practice,
water to supply rights subsequent to March, 1903, shall be shut off before
the supply to rights with earlier priorities than 1903 is diminished; flood
water rights with earlier priorities than 1903 shall be shut off in order of priority
until no flood water is being used before the high water rights shall be cut;
and in the same manner all high water rights shall be shut off in order of
priority, except as modified in paragraphs 9, 10, 13a, 13b, 13d and 13e hereof,
before there is any diminution in the low water rights, and that when water is
available only for the low water rights, it shall be shut off in accordance with
the respective priorities of low water rights, except as modified in paragraphs
11,12,13a, 13b, 13d and 13e hereof.
In order to simplify the distribution of water, the State Engineer or
other officer in charge of distribution of said System shall make, in his discretion,
the respective reductions as far as practicable, in accordance with four general
classes, which are set out as follows:
Class I, all rights with priorities up to and including the year 1875.
Class II, all rights with priorities from 1876 to 1890 inclusive.
Class III, all rights with priorities from 1891 to March 11, 1903, inclusive
Class IV, all rights which were initiated by application to the State
Engineer's office and whose priorities are subsequent to March 11, 1903.
B. That in as much as the amount of water available from the system
varies from year to year as the precipitation varies, and therefore the period
of beneficial use begins and ends at different times in each year, in all
instances herein where the term "Irrigation Season" is used, it is hereby
interpreted to mean that period each year between March 1st and November 1st
during which water can be beneficially applied in the growing of agricultural
crops en the particular land to which it is allocated, in accordance with duty
and priority, as specified herein and in said Tabulation.
C. That wherever in said Tabulation water rights are shown as having
a lower duty of water during flood or high water periods, as herein defined,
T191

than they have in the low period as herein defined, and those
rights which are set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 hereof as having
an extended period of use of high water, such rights are given a lower duty
of water, or an extended use of high water, or both, as the case may be, in
consideration of the benefit of the return flow therefrom to the river system
from the lands irrigated by water covered by such rights, and in the event
that the owners of such water rights shall sell, transfer or lease the same,
either in whole or in part, for the purpose of being applied to lands which
are included herein and are allotted a different duty of water, in accordance
herewith, or to be applied to lands not included herein, which if included would
have had, because of their character or location, a different duty of water,
then and in that event such water rights so sold, transferred or leased shall
continue to have the priority allotted thereto in this decree, but the duty of
water applied to the lands to which said water rights have been so sold,
transferred or leased shall be the duty of water applicable to such lands, if said
lands are included herein, and if not then said lands shall have the duty of watei
as determined by the State Engineer, or other officer in charge of the distribution
of the waters of said river system, and the use thereof shall be limited to the
same number of acres to which said water was allotted, as set out in said
Tabulation, provided, however, that in years of extreme drouth the State
Engineer or other officer in charge of the distribution of said system may allow
the temporary transfer or lease of said waters to other lands within said system,
without this limitation being applicable to said transfer or lease.
D. That except as set out in said Tabulation, all claims to the right to
the use of water of said System are forever barred, except as to such applications
as have been or may hereafter be filed in the office of the State Engineer
which have not, prior to January 8, 1937, been finally determined to be perfected
rights, which, when and as they are finally determined to be perfected rights
shall be added by supplemental decree to the rights herein adjudicated.
E. That the lands set out in said Tabulation are arid in character and
without the application thereto of water for irrigation will not produce valuable
crops, but with irrigation will produce valuable crops, and the use of water
for the irrigation of said lands is necessary for such irrigation and the use of
water for other purposes, as set out in said Tabulation, is necessary for such
purposes, and that neither the State of Utah, nor any other person, firm,
corporation, or association at the time of the entry hereof has any right to
the use of the water of said System except as herein and as in said Tabulation
set out, except such as may be finally adjudicated to be rights upon application
to the State Engineer, and upon applications now pending in his office, but
which have not yet been determined to be perfected rights, provided that if
such applications should finally result in perfected rights, then they shall be
added by supplemental decree to the rights herein adjudicated and set out in said
Tabulation.
F. That whenever in said Tabulation users have the right to use water
for irrigation purposes, such users shall also have the right to use domestic
or stock water, or both, from the same sources of supply and with the same
means of conveyance therefrom; the amount of domestic or stock water or
both which they are entitled to use at all times when it is practicable to deliver
the same is five per cent of their low water irrigation right, with the same
priority as set out in said Tabulation, plus whatever seepage or other losses
the State Engineer or other officer in charge of the distribution of said System
may determine is necessary to deliver such domestic or stock water or both
to the place of use through the now existing canals, ditches, pipe lines, e t c
as the case may be, provided, however* that no domestic or stock water shall
be allowed in any canal or ditch during the period of time when there is
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APPENDIX B

CHAPTER 67.
Senate Bill No. 113.
Compiled Laws, 1917, p. 724.
(Passed March 13, 1919. Approved March 13, 1919. In effect March 13, 1919.)

WATER AND WATER RIGHTS.
An Act defining general provisions concerning water and water rights, the
appropriation, administration, adjudication and use of water and water
rights, and repealing Chapters lf 2, 3f and 4, Title 55, of the Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1917, and all laws of Utah in conflict herewith.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
SECTION L Ownership of water. The water of all streams and other
sources in this State, whether flowing above or under the ground, in
•known or defined channels, is hereby declared to be the property of the
public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof.

Sec. 2. Standard of measurement. The standard unit of measurement of the flow of water shall be the discharge of one cubic foot per
second of time, which shall be known as a second-foot; and the standard
unit of measurement of the- volume of water shall be the acre-foot,
being the amount of water upon an acre covered one foot deep, equivalent to 43,560 cubic feet.
Sec. 3. Rights to the use. Beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this State.
Sec. 4. Public use—rights of way—-manner of exercise—acquisition.
The use of water for beneficial purposes, as provided in this Act, is
hereby declared to be a public use. Any person, corporation or association shall have a right of way across and upon public, private and
corporate lands, or other right of way, for the construction, maintenance, repair, and use of all necessary reservoirs, dams, water gates,
canals, ditches, flumeg, tunnels or other means of securing, storing and
conveying water for irrigation or for any necessary public use, or for
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drainage, upon payment of just compensation therefor, but such right
of way shall in all cases be exercised in a manner not unnecessarily to
impair the practical use of any other right of way, highway or public
or private road, nor unnecessarily to injure any public or private
property. Such right may be acquired in the manner provided by law
for the taking of private property for public use.
Sec, 5. Use of waterways already constructed—costs—time. When any
person, corporation or association desires to convey water for irrigation or any other beneficial purpose, and there is a canal or ditch
already constructed that can T>e used or enlarged to convey the required
quantity of water, then such person, corporation or association, or the
owner or owners of .the land through which a new canal or ditch would
have to Be constructed to convey the quantity of water necessary, shall
have the right to use or enlarge said canal or ditch already constructed,
by compensating the owner of the canal or ditch to be used1 or enlarged,
for the .damage, caused by said use or enlargement, and by paying an
equitable proportion of the maintenance of said canal jointly used or
enlarged; provided, that said enlargement shall be done at any time
from the 1st day of October to the 1st day of March, or any other time
that may be agreed upon with the owner of said canal or ditch, and the
additional water turned in shall bear its proportion of loss by evaporation and seepage.
Sec 6. Nonuse—reappropriation. When an appropriator or his successor in interest abandons or ceases to use water for a period of five
years, the right ceases, and thereupon such water reverts to the public,
and may be again appropriated, as provided in this Act.
Sec. 7.

State

Engineer—qualifications—appointment—term—powers

and duties—water districts. There shall be a State Engineer, who shall
be appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. He shall hold his office for the term of six years and
until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. He shall
have general administrative supervision of the waters of the State
and of their measurement, appropriation, apportionment and distribution. He shall have power to make and publish such rules and regulations as may be necessary from time to time fully to carry out the
duties of his office and particularly to secure the equitable and fair
apportionment and distribution of the water according to the respective rights of appropriators. The State Engineer may establish water
districts and define the boundaries thereof, said districts to be so
constituted as to secure the best protection to the claimants of water,
and the most economical supervision on the part of the State. No
person shall be appointed to the office of State Engineer who has
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not such theoretical knowledge and practical experience and skill as
shall fit him for the position.
Sec. 8. Applications for change—notice—protests—grounds of derision—appeals. Any person, corporation or association, entitled to the
use of water, may change the place of diversion or place of use and may
use the water for other purposes than those for which it was originally
appropriated, but no such change shall be made, if it impairs any vested
right, without just compensation; no change of point of diversion, place
or purpose of use shall be made except on the approval of an application of the owner by the State Engineer, Before the approval of an
application the State Engineer must, at the expense of the applicant,
to be paid in advance, give notice thereof by publication in some newspaper having general circulation within the boundaries of the river
system or near the water source in which the point of diversion of the
water is located; such notice shall give the name of the applicant, the
quantity of water involved, the stream or source from which the appropriation has been made, the point on the stream or source where, the
water is diverted, the point to which it is proposed to change the
diversion of the water, the place, purpose and extent of present use, and
the place, purpose and the extent of proposed use. Said notice to be
published at least once a week for a period of four weeks. -Any person, corporation or association interested may, at any time within
thirty days after the completion of the publication of said notice, file
with the State Engineer a protest against the granting of said application for change of point of diversion, place or purpose of use, stating
the reasons therefor, wliich shall be duly considered by the State Engineer, who shall approve or reject said application for change of point
of diversion, place, or purpose of use. Such application shall not be
rejected solely for the reason that such change would impair vested
rights of others, but the application if otherwise proper may be approved conditionally upon such conflicting rights being acquired. The
determination of the State Engineer shall be final unless appeal is taken
to the district court within sixty days of written notice to applicant
of action of the State Engineer. Any person holding an approved
application for the appropriation of water may change the point of
diversion, place or purpose of use under proceedings taken substantially as above set forth.
Sec. 9.

Flow of appropriated waters—deterioration—share loss—costs.

Upon application in writing and approval of the State Engineer, any
appropriated water may be turned into the channel of any natural
stream or natural body of water or into a reservoir constructed across
the bed of any natural stream, and commingled with its waters, and
then be taken out, either above or below the point where emptied into
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the 6tream, body of water or reservoir, but, in so doing, the original
water in such stream, body of water or reservoir must not be deteriorated in quality or disminished in quantity, and the additional water
turned shall bear its share of loss by evaporation and seepage and of
the maintenance of said reservoir, and an equitable proportion of the
cost of the reservoir site and of the construction.
Sec. 10. Priority of appropriations—preferences. Appropriators shall
have priority among themselves according to the dates of their respective appropriations, so that each appropriator shall be entitled to
receive the whole supply to which his certificate entitles him before
any subsequent appropriator shall have any right; provided, in times
of-scarcity, while priority of appropriation shall give the better rights
as between those using water for the same purpose, the use for domestic
purposes shall have preference over use for all other purposes, provided, that such use shall not involve unnecessary waste; and use for
agricultural purposes shall have preference over use for any other purpose except domestic use.
Sec.lL Subscriptions or purchase of stock in similar corporations.
Any irrigation or reservoir company, incorporated and existing under
the laws of this State, may purchase or subscribe for the capital stock
of any other similar corporation which, at the time of such purchase
or subscription, shall be or is about to be incorporated; provided, that
such purchase or subscription shall be made only when permitted by
the original articles.of incorporation or by amendment thereto proposed and adopted according to law, and such corporations are hereby
permitted and authorized to amend their articles of incorporation so
as to authorize such purchase or subscription.
Sec. 12. Maintenance—repairs—crossings. The owner or owners of
any ditch, canal, flume or other water course shall maintain the same
in repair, so as to prevent waste of water or damage to the property
of others. Such persons are required, by bridge or otherwise, to keep
such ditch, canal, flume or other water course in good repair where the
same crosses any public road or highway, so as to prevent obstruction
to travel, or damage or overflow to such public road or highway, excepting at any place where the public maintains or may hereafter elect
to maintain such devices.
Sec. 13. Liabilities for use—actions for contribution. When

two

or

more persons, companies or corporations are associated by agreement
or otherwise, in the use of any dam, canal, reseryoir, ditch, lateral,
flume or other, means of conserving or conveying water for the irrigation of land or for other purpose, each of them shall be liable to the
other for the reasonable expenses of maintaining, operating ana con-
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trolling the same, in proportion to the share in the use or ownership
of the water to which he is entitled. If any person, company or corporation refuses or neglects to pay his proportion of such expense,
after five days' notice in writing demanding such payment, he shall
be liable therefor in an action for contribution.
Sec, 14. Appurtenant lands—transfer ofrights—recording.All water
hereafter appropriated for irrigation purposes from works constructed
or controlled by .the United States shall be appurtenant to specified
lands owned or occupied by the person claiming the right to use the
water, so long as the water is used beneficially thereon; provided,
that if for any reason it should at any time become impracticable to
use water beneficially or economically for the irrigation of any land
to which the right of the same is appurtenant, said right may be severed
from said land, and simultaneously transferred, and become appurtenant to other land, without losing priority of right theretofore established, if such change can be made without detriment to existing rights;
and in case of such change, the owner of such water right shall execute
and acknowledge a proper instrument of transfer describing therein the
land from and to which such water is transferred, which instrument
shall be recorded in the County Recorder's office of the county in which
the land is situated.
Sec 15. Use passes to grantee of land;—succession—payment of assessments—reservations. A right to the use of water appurtenant to the
land shall pass to the grantee of such land, and, in cases where such
right has been exercised in irrigating different parcels.of land at
different times, such right shall pass to the grantee of any parcel of
land on which such right was exercised next preceding the time of
the execution of any conveyance thereof; subject, however, in all cases
to payment by grantee of any such conveyance of all amounts unpaid
on any assessment then due upon* any such right; provided, that any
such right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may be reserved
by the grantor in any such conveyance, by making such reservation
in express terms inserted in such conveyance, or may be separately
conveyed.
Sec 16. Transfers by deed—recording—imparting notice. Water
rights shall be transferred by deeds, in substantially the same manner
as real estate, except when they are represented by shares of stock in a
corporation, and such deeds shall be recorded in books kept for that
purpose in the office of the%recorder of the county where the place of
diversion of the water from its natural channel is situated, and in the
county where the water is applied. Every deed of water right so
recorded shall, from the time of filing the same with the recorder for
record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof, and subse-
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quent purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice.
Sec. 17. Rights of subsequent purchasers. Every .deed of water
right within this State hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as
provided in tlus Act, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser
in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, of the same water
right, or any portion thereof, where his own deed shall be duly
recorded
Sec 18. Liability for interference. Any person, corporation or association who shall in any way unlawfully interfere with, injure,
destroy or remove any dam, headgate, iwieir, or other appliance for
the diversion, apportionment or measurement of water, or who shall
interfere with any of the persons authorized by this Act to apportion
water, while in the discharge of their duties, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall also be liable in damages to any person injured by
such unlawful act
Sec-19, Obstructions, Whenever any person, corporation or association has the right of way for any canal or other iwater course,
it shall be unlawful for any person to place or maintain in place any
obstruction, by fence or otherwise, along or across such canal or water
course, without providing gates sufficient for the passage of the owner
or owners of such canal or .water course or their agents. Any person,
corporation or association violating the provisions of this Section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Sec. 20, Determination of rights. Upon a verified petition to the
State Engineer, signed by five or more water users upon any
stream or water source, requesting the determination of the relative rights of the various claimants to the waters of such streams
or water source, it shall be the duty of the State Engineer, if upon
investigation he finds the facts and conditions are such as to justify,
to make a determination of said rights, fixing a time for making such
examination and taking such testimony as will enable him to determine
the rights of the various claimants, provided that if 25 or more or a
majority of the water users on any stream if there be less than 25,
so petition, then the State Engineer shall proceed as in this Section
provided for.
Sec. 21. Action begun—contents. When the State Engineer has
completed the survey of any river system or water source, he shall
bring an action in the district court and shall file a written statement
with the clerk of the district court, setting forth the fact of the completion of such survey, the names and postoffice addresses of all
persons, corporations and associations using water from said river sys-
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tern or water source, so far as the same are known to the State Engineer, and containing such other facts and information as he may deem
necessary.
Sec. 22. Statement as to water users—publication of notice—date as
to survey—claims—field investigations. Upon the filing of any suit for the
determination of water rights, the clerk of the district court shall
notify the State Engineer that such suit has been filed. Whereupon
the State Engineer shall, as expeditiously as possible, prepare and file
with the court a statement giving the names and addresses of all the
claimants to the use of water from the river system or water source
involved in such action, so far as the said claimants are known; and
to this end the clerk of said court shall publish, once a week for two
consecutive weeks in a newspaper designated by said clerk as most
likely to give notice to such-claimants, a notice setting forth that such
a petition has been filed, naming or describing the river system or
water source involved and requiring claimants to the use of water
therefrom to notify tKe State Engineer of their names and addresses
for the purposes hereinafter set forth. When such statement shall have
been filed or when the clerk of said court shall have ascertained as
nearly as may be the names of all claimants, said clerk shall within
fifteen days prepare a notice setting forth the date when the State
Engineer will begin the survey of the system or water source and the
ditches diverting water therefrom, or the fact that such survey has
already been completed, as the case may be, and also giving notice
that such claimants must within sixty days of the service of such
notice file a written statement with the clerk of said1 court, setting forth
their respective claims to the use of such water. Where such a suit
shall have been filed, it shall be the duty of the State Engineer upon
receiving notice thereof to examine the records of his office with
respect to the water system or water source involved, and if they are
incomplete, to make such field investigations as may be necessary for the
preparation of the report required by Section 28 hereof.
Sec. 23. Service of notice—when effective—forms for answer.. Such
notice requiring each claimant to file such statement shall serve as a
summons in such action, and shall be served as a summons issued by a
district court, personally upon each known claimant, and shall also be
published five times, once each week for five successive weeks, in a
newspaper or newspapers designated by the judge of said court as
most likely to give notice to the persons served. The clerk of said
court shall on or before the date of first publication also mail, by
registered letter to each of the persons, corporations and associations
as are known, a copy of said notice, and a blank form on which said
claimant shall present in writing, as provided in the next succeed-
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ing section, all the particulars relating to the appropriation of the
water of said river system or water source to which he lays claim.
The service of notice is complete when personal service is had, or, when
it is not had, on the expiration of the thirtieth day after the first
publication of such notice.
Sec, 24. Time for filing and contents of statement* Each person, corporation? or association claiming a right to use any water of said
river system or water source shall, within sixty days after the service
of such notice mentioned in the preceding section, file in the office
of the clerk of the district court, a statement in writing which shall
be signed and verified by the oath of the claimant, and shall include as
near as may be the following: The name and postoffice address of
the person, corporation or association making the claim; the nature of
the use on which? the claim of appropriation is based; the flow of water
used in cubic feet per second and the time during which it has been
used each year; the name of the stream or other source from which
the w&ter is diverted, the place on such stream or source where
the water is diverted, and the nature of the diverting works; the date
when the first* work for diverting the water was begun, and the nature
of such work; the date when the water was first used, the flow in
cubic feet per second, and the time during which the water was used
the first year; and the place and manner of present use; and such
other facts as will clearly define the extent and nature of the appropriation claimed, or as may be required by the blank form, which shall
be furnished by the State Engineer under the direction of the court.
Sec. 25. Irrigated land—area—location—soil—crops. If the water
claimed to have been appropriated is used for irrigation, the statement
shall show, in addition to the facts required by Section 24 hereof, as
nearly as possible the area of land irrigated the first year and each
subsequent year; the total area at present irrigated, and its location
in each section, township and range wherein it is situated; the character and depth of the soil and the kind of crops raised and maximum
and minimum acreage irrigated during total period of use.
Sec. 26. Water power—amount—purpose—place.
If the water
claimed to have been appropriated is used for developing power, tliQ
statement shall show in addition to the facts required by Section 24
hereof, the number, size and kind of water wheels employed; the head
under which each wheel is operated; the amount of power produced,
and the purposes for which and the places where it is used; and the
point where the water is returned to the natural stream or source.
Sec. 27. Milling or mining—district—material. If the water claimed
to have been appropriated is used for milling or mining, the statement
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shall show, in addition to the facts required by Section 24 hereof, the
name of the mill and its location, or the name of the mine and the mining district in which it is situated; lie nature of the material milled
or mined, and the place where the water is returned to the .natural
stream or source.
Sec 28. Tabulation of facts—report—recommendation by engineer.
Within thirty days after the expiration of the sixty days allowed for
filing statements or claims, the State Engineer shall begin to tabulate
the facts contained in the statements filed, and to investigate, wherever he shall deem necessary, the facts set forth in said statements,
with reference to the surveys already made or by further surveys, and
shall, as expeditiously as possible, make a report to the court with
his recommendation of how all rights involved shall be determined.
Sec 29. Effect of statement—failure to make operates as a bar—proviso as to actual notice. The filing of each statement by a claimant shall
be considered notice to all persons, corporations and associations of
the claim of the party making the same, and any person, corporation or association failing to.make and deliver'such statement of
claim to the clerk of the court within the time prescribed by law shall
be forever barred and estopped from subsequently asserting any rights
and shall be held to have forfeited all rights to the use of said water
theretofore claimed by him; provided, however, that any claimant upon
whom no other service of said notice shall have been made than by
publication in a newspaper may apply to the court for permission to
file a statement of claim after the time therefor has expired, and
the court may extend the time for filing said statement, not exceeding six months from the first publication of said notice; but, before said
time is extended, the applicant shall give notice by publication in a
newspaper having general circulation on said river system or near the
water source, to all other persons, corporations or associations interested in the water of that river system or water source, and shall
make it appear to the satisfaction of the court that during the pendency of the proceedings he had no actual notice thereof in time to
appear and file a statement and make proof of his claim; and all
parties interested may present affidavits as to the matter of his
actual notice of the pendency of such proceedings.
Sec 30. Statements in lieu of pleadings—investigators of facts—
competent evidence. The statements filed by the claimants shall stand
in the place of pleadings, and issue may be made thereon. Whenever
requested so to do the State Engineer shall furnish the court with
any information which he may possess, or copies of any of the records
of his office which relate to the water of said river-system or water
source. The court may appoint referees, masters, engineers, soil
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specialists or other persons, as necessity or emergency may require,
to assist in taking testimony or investigating facts, and in all proceedings for the determination of the rights of claimants to the water
of a river system or water source, the statements of claimants, maps,
records and reports of the State Engineer, other engineer, soil specialist or peTson appointed by the court, shall be competent land
prima lacie evidence of the facts stated therein or delineated thereon.
Sec. 31. Amendments—extension of time. The court shall have
power to allow amendments to any petition, statement or pleading;
to extend as provided in this Act tfie time for filing any statement
of claim; and to extend, upon due cause shown, the time for filing
any other pleading, statement, report or protest.
Sec. 32. Proposed determination of rights—notice of same—objections temporary distribution of water—proviso. After full consideration of
the statements of claims, the surveys, records and files and after a
personal examination of the river system or water source involved,
if such examination is deemed necessary, the State Engineer shall
formulate a proposed determination of all rights to the use of the
water of such river system or water source, and a copy of such proposed determination shall be mailed by regular mail to each claimant,
with notice that any claimant dissatisfied with such determination may
within ninetydays from such date of mailing file with the clerk of
the district court a written objection thereto duly vefrified on oath. The
State Engineer shall distribute the waters in accordance with said
proposed determination until a final decree is rendered by the court,
or until the court shall instruct him otherwise. Provided, that the
right to the use of said waters have not been theretofore decreed
or adjudicated, but if formerly decreed and adjudicated, said waters
shall be distributed in accordance with such decree until the same
be revetsed, modified, vacated, or otherwise legally set aside.
Sec. 33. Judgment on proposed determination. If no contest on the
part of any claimant or claimants shall have been filed, the court shall
render a judgment in accordance with such proposed determination
which shall determine and establish the rights of the several claimants to the use of the water of said river system or water source;
and among other things shall set forth the name and postoffice address
of the person, corporation or association entitled to the use of the
water; the quantity of water in acre-feet or the flow of water in second-feet; the time during which the water is to be used each year;
the name of the stream or other source from which the water is diverted; the place on the stream or other source where the water is
diverted; the priority date of the fright; and such other matters as
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will fully and completely define the right of said person, corporation
or association to the use of the water.
Sec 34. Procedure in case of objections. If any contest or objection on the part of any claimant or claimants shall have been filed,
as in this Act (provided, the court shall give not less than fifteen
days' notice to all claimants, stating when and where testimony will
be taken, provided that such testimony shall be taken in the county
in which said action is pending. The court may grant adjournments
from time to time as occasion may require.
Sec. 35. Judgment after hearings. Upon the completion of the
hearing, after objections filed, the court shall enter judgment which
shall determine and establish the rights of the several claimants to
the use of the water of the river system or water source as provided
in Section 33 of this Act.
Sec. 36. Right of appeal—record—procedure and practice. From all
final judgments of the*district court there shall be a right of appeal
to the supreme court. The appeal shall be upon the record made in
the district court; and may as in equity cases be on questions of both
law and fact. All'proceedings on appeal shall be conducted according
to the provisions of the code of civil procedure, and the practice on
appeals from the district court to the supreme court.
Sec. 37. Certificates of award—filing and record—effect. If no appeal
is taken from said judgment within six montths after the same has
been entered, or, if the case is appealed, within thirty days after the
final judgment on appeal is entered, it shall be the duty of the clerk
of the district court to issue to each person, corporation or association having been awarded the use of water by said judgment, a
certificate in triplicate attested under the seal of the court, setting
forth the determination of said water right, as specified in Section
33. Three copies of said certificate 'shall be transmitted, in person
or by registered mail, to the appropriator, who shall, within thirty
days, have one of the same recorded in books especially provided for
that purpose in the office of the county irecorder of the county in
which the water is diverted from its natural channel, one in the county
where the water is applied, and the other shall be delivered to the
State Engineer, and filed in his office as part of the records thereof.
Said certificate shall supersede any certificate thereon issued by the
State Engineer.
Sec. 38. Determination of rights in river systems—the State a necessary party. Whenever any civil action is commenced in the district
court involving the use of water from any river system or water
source, the court, in its discretion, may, if a general determination
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of the rights to the use of water from said river system or water
source has not already been made, proceed, as in this Act provided,
to make such a general determination. In any action for the determination of water rights the State of Utah shall be joined as a necessary
party.
Sec. 39. Report in case of waste—action by Engineer—re-determination. Whenever any person or user of water from any river system
or water source believes that there is a waste of water from said
riveir system or water source, said person or user of water may report
the matter to the State Engineer or may petition the district court
for the investigation of such alleged waste; whereupon the State Engineer may make an investigation and report his findings to said court
of such alleged waste or said court may order or make such an investigation, and if such investigation warrants may proceed to make a
determination, if such has not yet been had, or a re-determinatiou,
in whole or in part, of the rights to the use of the water from said
river system or water source.
Sec. 40. Bond on action for re-determination—liability of claimant.

Wherever a general determination of water rights upon any river
system or water source has been made by the district court, any claimant to the use of water from said rriver system or water source seeking
a re-determination of water rights upon such diver system or water
source shall, before commencing any action for such re-determination
or for the revision of any final judgment other than as provided in
Section 21 hereof, furnish to the court in which said action is commenced and before the filing of any petition or complaint for such
purpose, a good and sufficient bond, in a form and with sureties
approved by the court, in a sum fixed by the court, and at least equal
to twice the estimated costs which may arise in said action; and if final
judgment after hearing, or after appeal, should appeal be taken, should
be awarded against such claimant, then such claimant shall be liable
for the payment in full of all costs arising in such action and for all
damages to other parties to said action arising therefrom.
Sec. 41. Acquisition of the right of use—purpose—order—more beneficial use. Rights to the use of the unappropriated public water in the
State may be acquired by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter
provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some
useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between appropriators, the one
first in time shall be first in right; provided, that when a use designated by an application to appropriate any of the unappropriated
waters of the State would materially interfere with a more beneficial
use of such water, then the application shall be dealt with as provided
in Section 48 hereof.
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Certain lands in this State have enjoyed some benefits from the application of water
thereto by other than diversion from natural channels or sources, such for instance, as
natural swamps or meadow lands watered from over flow, seepage water, etc.
The Statutes appear not to point the way sufficiently to enable the State Engineer
certainly to determine water rights with respect to these classes of lands and no determination,
therefore, is made with respect to them. The tabulation separately shown hereafter shows
facts as to these lands and water uses, such as dates of priority, points of collection, general
location and such other data as may enable the court to determine the status of these uses.
The services of the State Engineer, if necessary, will gladly be given to assist the court
in arriving at its conclusions.

